Saturday, 17 May 2014

What is Boko Haram and whence did it arise?



The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls by Boko Haram has outraged the world; particularly after their captors promised to sell the girls as slaves. They are portrayed as Muslim fundamentalists seeking to impose a harsh Sharia Law over the whole of Nigeria. They have murdered over a thousand Nigerians in the past few years and are acting with utter impunity against the pathetic forces arrayed against them by the Nigerian State.

The last sentence highlights the reality of the problem – it is not the rise of Boko Haram which is the problem but the willing inability of the State to confront them and the concomitant complicity of several major political forces in the country in the formation and sustenance of Boko Haram for their own domestic political aims. The complicity of ‘legitimate’ Nigerian political forces in the activities of Boko Haram is a guide as to why the president, Goodluck Johnathan, is afraid to move against Boko Haram in anything more than a token resistance.

Boko Haram emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri led by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2004 it moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called ‘Afghanistan’, and used to attack nearby police outposts, killing mainly police officers. It t started as a cell of the Muslim sect called ‘Jama’atul Ahlus Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihad’ but advertised itself as ‘Boko Haram’ from the Hausa word ‘boko’ meaning “animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education” and the Arabic word ‘haram’ figuratively meaning “sin” (literally, “forbidden“).

From its earliest days it received support from the Northern Nigerian Muslim political elites. The elites’ power was waning and the Nigerian army, which had always been the backbone for Northern political influence, had been changing into an army dominated by the Middle Belt officers (mainly Tiv). The Northern Fulani military caste was ageing, retiring and withdrawing from military activities. The army was becoming less Muslim and more Christian or Animist, particularly the junior officers. The traditional Northern (mainly Fulani-Hausa and Kanuri) elites were Muslims and represented mainly herders, operating under a system of feudal Emirs or Sardaunas.

A substantial part of the Nigerian North is not Muslim. In areas like Plateau State Christians are in the majority. Christians in the North are primarily agriculturalists while Muslims are herders. For centuries there has been a war between herders and farmers. This is a traditional conflict across Africa as each group seeks to use the rapidly disappearing arable land south of the Sahara. Moreover the Northern Muslim herders have been beset by cattle-raiders from their own side. In the last few years there have been incessant deadly attacks on Fulani (Muslim) settlements and villages in northern Nigeria by armed bandits – largely made up of disgruntled Fulani who themselves have lost cattle. Gangs of heavily armed bandits prowl the vast Dajin Rugu forest which spans several hundred square kilometres across Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna states and Niger State. This is not only a Nigerian problem. In February 2012 alone over 23,000 Fulani herders poured into Cameroon from Nigeria's north-eastern state of Taraba, following deadly clashes with farming communities. Many of the armed bandits are Fulanis who have joined gangs involved in cross-border armed robbery and cattle-rustling in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal and Mali. 
Thousands of herders in northern Nigeria's Kaduna State have fled their homes in 2013 and 2014 following raids by cattle rustlers that killed at least dozens of people. This ugly trend is compounding the dilemma of the Fulani herders who are caught in a vicious cycle of conflict with farmers over-grazing the farmed land of the Christians. It is a situation ripe for manipulation.

There is also a long historical trail to these conflicts. These ethnic conflict groups extend far beyond Nigeria’s borders. The Fulani (Peul) are the remnants of the old Fulani Empire which dominated much of West Africa, and can be found in Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. They are a minority tribe in all but Guinea. The Kanuri (of Bornu State) are the descendants of the Bornu Empire (1380-1893) which was a continuation of the great Kanem Empire founded centuries earlier by the Sayfawa Dynasty. In time it would become even larger than Kanem, incorporating areas that are today parts of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These two Muslim ethnic groups make up the large majority of the members of Boko Haram.

The sense of diminishing power and the concomitant rise to power of the South-South (a term used to refer to the Nigerian states of the South east where the oil is found and has been dominated in the new politics of the region by the Ijaws) was threatening to the Northern elites. The Muslims had been fighting running battles in Plateau State and elsewhere in the North with the largely Christian pastoralists, and they felt their interests would only be maintained in Nigeria through the formula of ‘zoning’, in which state power is divided among the various ethnicities and regions; theoretically sustaining balance.

This was incorporated in the rules which governed the dominant political party PDP, the Peoples Democratic Party. The PDP agreed to ‘rotate’ the presidency, vice-presidency and other key jobs between the North and the South on a regular basis to ensure “fairness” of representation. The fact that Nigeria is composed of more than just North and South was not reflected in the zoning rules. There are many Northern Christians but they don’t count as Northerners in zoning. There are massive competitions for primacy among the large Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups on a national scale and the oil industry in the Delta is a hotbed of competition among the Efiks, Ibibio, Igbo and Ijaws of the Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states; those who were getting very rich on the production of oil.

The Northern elites decided that they would have to insist that there be no third term for Obasanjo, the erstwhile president. They decided that they would put a Northerner (Yar’Adua) in power as the president and head of the PDP party. Goodluck Jonathan was installed as vice-president to ‘balance’ the ticket with a Southerner. But Yar’Adua was very ill and went off to a clinic in Saudi Arabia where he died, leaving Jonathan as President. The North felt that it did not get its full entitlement of power with the death of Yar’Adua. They demanded that a Northerner succeed Goodluck, but Goodluck decided to run again for President. The North took no chances and, while building up a powerful political force inside the PDP and the governorships, they also decided that they would send many Fulani and Kanuri children from the Northern madrassas to Libya and the Middle East for training. Under the pretext of sponsoring youngsters to study in the Middle East, they sent them to terrorist training camps.

Although Boko Haram officially started in 2002 there had been several terrorist activities which preceded it. These young ‘jihadists’ proved their worth to their sponsors and the best of them got overseas scholarships to terrorist schools. In the early months of May 1986, thirty-six Jihadist hardliners went on a rampage, attacking Christian students of the University of Sokoto. According to a participant in that raid in that same week, the Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of General Babangida mobilised the jihadists and provided them with some military vans and army uniforms which they used to start killing innocent and defenceless Christians all over the Northern states. The following year, March 5 1987 to be precise, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida secretly armed the jihadists through one of his close aides by the name of Captain Hassan Abubakar. They attacked Christians and foreigners across Kano and Borno. Their ‘success’ led to them being chosen for training outside Nigeria.

The jihadists claim to have been trained in eight different countries namely Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Egypt and the Niger Republic. They travelled as a group and received basic and advanced training. As proof of the success of their training they sport a mark (tattoo) showing proficiency. The mark is in the form of a sword held in a hand. Those who went through the training regard it as the ‘license to kill for Allah’. They included Ali Baba Nur, Asari Dokubo, Jasper Akinbo, Mohammed Yusuf, Salisu Maigari, Danlami Abubakar, Cletus Okar, Ali Qaqa, Maigari Haliru and Asabe Dantala.

The raids on Christians increased. The militancy exhibited by the leaders brought out a lot of support from Northern youth. This was not entirely because they had become hard-line jihadists but mainly because the substantial financial support from the Northern Emirs, General Babangida, the Northern governors and the Northern PDP political and business elite made jihadism a career choice. As the Christians fought back, it became easier to recruit jihadists.

One of the key demands of Boko Haram is the creation of a Muslim state in Nigeria which would be governed by the Sharia Law. The question of the legal co-existence of a Sharia law system in parallel with Nigerian civil law was raised in 1999 when the civil government of the former General Obasanjo had begun under a new constitution. Islamic law was allowed to exist under the British but elected Nigerian governments after independence did not recognise Islamic law as equal to civil law or binding on citizens unless they wanted to be so bound.

Despite many misgivings, in 2000, several states were given the option to use Sharia law. Since 1999 Sharia has been instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in the Muslim-majority and in some parts of three Muslim-plurality states for Muslim citizens. In 2002, in defiance of the authorities in Oyo State, the Supreme Council of Sharia carried out a ceremony in Ibadan's central mosque to inaugurate a panel to rule on civil matters in the region; to be empowered to decide on matters such as marriage, divorce and land disputes. The extension of Sharia law to a southern Christian state (actually the West) was a bold move by the Muslims. It was strongly rejected by Christians. What they objected to mostly was the cruel punishments of stoning to death and cutting of hands of the convicted as part of Sharia.

The Muslims of the North, despite their religious preference for Sharia were also appalled by the primitive punishments being applied. They were attracted to Sharia for different reasons. The Nigerian civil administration has always been riddled with corruption and injustice. Justice is a commodity not a birth right. They viewed the Sharia law as practised by their neighbours and religious co-believers as more likely to be fair and timely than a disinterested civil administration which was not inherently fair or just. The predilection for Sharia law was a powerful boost to the jihadists.

The militancy of Boko Haram was muted under the short presidency of Yar’Adua, a scion of one of the most powerful Northern families. He kept Northern political hegemony in power and most of his close associates were from the Northern elites. They kept Boko Haram in check. However, Yar’Adua was far more ill than anyone knew and died during his first term after a protracted stay in a Saudi hospital. His Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan became the accidental president; much as he had become the accidental Governor of Bayelsa when his mentor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the Governor was forced from office in 2005.
In 2007 Jonathan was vice-president and in 2010, at the death of Yar’Adua, he became president. In the meteoric rise to the top he had very little chance to pick up the skills and abilities needed for the job, especially in dealing with political sophisticates like Babangida, Obasanjo, Aliyu Gusau and David Mark; all of whom had years of plotting, coup-making and intrigue behind them. Those who could have helped him, like General T.Y. Danjuma, were ignored and isolated. Jonathan has bungled his way in the presidency ever since. His cardinal sin, in the eyes of the North, was to run for president on his own instead of allowing a Northerner in to finish the ‘Northern turn’ cut short by the death of Yar’Adua. On 18 May 2010, the National Assembly approved Jonathan's nomination of former Kaduna State governor Namadi Sambo, an architect, for the position of vice- president.

With Jonathan’s election as president in his own right Northerners turned up the heat on the government by activating Boko Haram. There have been bombs, church-burnings, communal violence and a campaign to cause havoc in the country. The stated vow of Boko Haram has been to make Nigeria ungovernable. This is an amusing thought as there are very few Nigerians who have ever operated under the delusion that Nigeria has ever been governable. In 1965 there was widespread violence in the West as the Action Party turned on itself and killed large numbers of Yoruba. The Biafran War followed with the Igbo being driven from the North and calamitous battles fought between the two forces which left the East in famine and disease. Years of military rule followed, where kleptocracy and corruption thrived, even during a brief interlude of civilian rule. The roads have deteriorated and become largely impassable. There is no good drinking water in rural areas and in most cities. Boreholes which were paid for have never been drilled. Rural electricity has suffered from widespread theft of copper wire; blackouts of electricity are frequent and generators the rule. The creeks are polluted with oil spills. The rail system has largely disappeared, universities are frequently in a state of strike; hospitals are without medicines and refineries barely function. What is it that Boko Haram can do to make Nigeria ungovernable?

What Boko Haram has found, much to the displeasure of the self-appointed Northern elites, is that there are a very large number of Christians in the North. Other than in three states there is a large Christian presence; a presence which is being activated by the open support of the Northern elites; a Christian presence which is gathering its forces together to repel the excesses of Boko Haram and Sharia. The Igbo are sending buses to the north to bring back Igbo and Muslims of the South are starting a trek northwards, but these are trivial movements. There is nothing in the Northern economy which even hints at an ability to survive without the South and its oil revenues. The North needs the South but the South doesn’t need the North.

The whole edifice of what passes for governance in Nigeria is grounded upon the production of oil and the theft of its revenues. There is very little productive industry or agriculture in the North which will sustain its populace in food and jobs without a regular and hefty payment of money to the Northern states by the Federal Government from revenues derived from the oil industry.

The fundamental issue of this revenue sharing is the implementation of the ‘derivation principle’. After the ravages of the Biafran War the country was reunited. The vast oil wealth of the Delta was distributed by the Federal Government using a formula which divided the national revenue derived from the oil industry equally among the states. Each state in the Federation receives a notionally equal share of the oil revenue (since 1995 set at 13% for each state) from the Federal Government. So, in theory, each state of the North gets 13% of the revenue even though the oil is actually produced in the states of the South-South who see the oil as ‘theirs’. Unfortunately their territory is effectively the same area as the defeated Biafran State so they had little choice. Under military governments the derivation formula was set at 10%. It is crucial to the Northern states that they receive the money from the derivation principle and the presidency of a South-South politician is a risk which seems threatening to them; hence the reliance on zoning.

The South-South states have their own ‘terrorist’ problems with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and those who terrorise the oil industry in the Delta. The terrorists of the Delta were similar to those in the North without the religious baggage, as MEND and the Delta militants were created and funded by the political elites of the South-South for their own ends. In many cases the actual leadership of these two groups, Boko Haram and MEND, were trained together in Libya at the same terrorist school in Benghazi.

The earliest groups to form were MEND and the Delta militants. They were funded by the South-South governors of Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa states and their political allies to make it difficult for the forces of law and order (the ‘Kill and Go’ police and the Task Force) to interfere with the stealing of oil in the region; known in Nigeria as ‘bunkering’. Every day the Nigerian economy loses between 150,000 and 320,000 barrels of oil. These are stolen by 'bunkerers', who have small tanker vessels which load the oil in the Delta and tranship this stolen oil to offshore tankers which deliver this stolen oil to other West African states. In addition to the theft of crude oil, other inland illegal tanker trucks load the imported refined products and drive these into neighbouring countries for black market sale. At $100 a barrel that amounts to around US$30 million a day for crude oil and around US$8 million per day for gasoline (PMS) and diesel. In short the bunkering of oil and refined products in the South-South brings in an illegal $42 million a day or over US$12 billion a year.

This illegal trade was pioneered under President Abacha when Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe and his naval colleagues Victor Ombu and Ibrahim Ogohi established the smuggling of petroleum products from Port Harcourt and Warri to neighbouring West African countries. This naval assistance was important as over fifty vessels were engaged in the bunkering.

Soon the conflict between the military and the ‘terrorists’ took over the news and public attention. The issues of losing USD$12 billion a year to theft receded in public (and international) consciousness as the battles with MEND and the others took their attention. The international oil companies in the Delta, other than for the periodic inconvenience of the occasional kidnapping and ransom of staffs, were not terribly concerned, largely because most of the terrorist activities were concentrated on-shore and in the creeks. The international oil companies have production-sharing agreements with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which delivers the major part of the oil revenues for onshore production to the NNPC. For oil garnered from deep water production the oil companies receive around 60% of the revenue. They are financially better off delivering crude from their deep water wells so were not terribly concerned by the shutdowns of onshore production by MEND or anyone else.

Within a relatively short period of time and lots of publicity these terrorist groups of the South-South were ‘settled’ – a Nigerian term which signifies the transfer of cash for a designated behaviour. In several states the South-South governors continued to fund the militants, who also acted as their election agents, ‘Area Boys’. The militant leader of MEND, Asari Dokubo, was a graduate of the Benghazi school and was imprisoned for a while in Abuja. He is free and many of the MEND arms suppliers (primarily in South Africa and Angola) are back in business but at a lower level of activity. Their common nom de guerre, Jomo Gbomo, makes their public pronouncements. Henry Okah of MEND was arrested in Angola and brought to trial in a sealed courtroom (under Yar’Adua), and released. ‘General’ Boyloaf, who had taken over was also settled and they both resumed a less adventurous life.

Goodluck Johnathan was the Governor of Bayelsa State before becoming President and was not unfamiliar with the workings of MEND and the Delta ‘terrorists’. It is a cash cow for the South-South leadership and a ready-made political force. It is justified by alluding to the fact that this is ‘their’ oil so they have found a way to make more for themselves than under the derivation principle. Boko Haram was seen as the Northern equivalent of MEND.

The problem arose when the Al Qaida groups operating along the Sahel made contact with Boko Haram and introduced foreign fighters into their midst with little respect for the wishes of the Northern elites which continued to fund and arm them. Their ideology was a bit extreme for the more practical Northern elites but Boko Haram soon grew bigger than they could control. It operated on international jihadi principles. The Northern leaders still deal with Boko Haram as a buffer for their political adventures. Boko Haram is still useful to them. After the abduction of the girls, the Northern elders used the president’s inability to catch them to issue a declaration saying that Goodluck Jonathan had lost his bearings and had failed in his most solemn responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Nigerians. Therefore, power must return to the North in 2015. The position of the Northern elders is clear – Johnathan must not run in 2015 and a Northerner must become president.

There is no shortage of self-appointed Northern saviours. Former Vice-President Atiku is convinced he was short changed by Obasanjo in his effort to succeed him. David Mark wants to use his key role as president of the Senate for the job and sees the presidency as his next logical step in his collection of titles. Perhaps the most worrying is Aliyu Gusau, the former National Security Director and now Minister of Defence. He has always stated that one day he will be president and he hasn’t given up on his ambition. There was a fury in the country over Jonathan’s appointment of Gusau as Defence Minister. Although he was a General, the army despises him and tried to get him fired as soon as he was appointed. It wasn’t an ideological call. Gusau was one of the key people arranging arms for Boko Haram and, at the same time, keeping the Nigerian army very short of bullets and supplies. The army refused to meet with him when he was appointed, but eventually Jonathan forced them to meet. Gusau continues to play a much compromised role in this business and has been one of the key impediments to allowing foreign assistance to the Boko Haram incursions.

Jonathan is afraid of him and, at the same time, hopes Aliyu Gusau will act as a bridge for him to his Northern friends and sponsors. This is not a government with any principles, direction or conscience. There is nothing the Nigerian Government is going to do to resolve the Boko Haram problem. They have too much at stake financially to make a real effort and the military is too weak.

However there is a solution which is being considered. Over a third of the Nigerian army is serving outside of Nigeria as peacekeepers in other parts of Africa (Mali, Sudan CAR, Niger, etc.). They are fully armed and they are very hostile to Boko Haram and what they stand for. They are led primarily by Middle Belt officers and are now engaged in meetings to decide how to proceed. The problem isn’t lack of will but in overcoming the pressure for a ’Colonel’s Coup’ as opposed to a ‘General’s Coup’. This is being worked on now. There is a high likelihood that the civilian government in Nigeria will change soon as a response to the failures of politicians to agree on even the most basic policies. It will be no surprise when the green in Nigeria’s flag is once again khaki green.

* Dr. Gary K. Busch is an international trade unionist, an academic, a businessman and a political affairs and business consultant for 40 years.


Originally posted on: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/91745

Monday, 12 May 2014

Nobel Peace Laureates to Human Rights Watch: Close Your Revolving Door to U.S. Government




The leading human rights organization's close ties to the U.S. government call its independence into question.
By Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Mairead Maguire
The following letter was sent to Human Rights Watch's Kenneth Roth on behalf of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Mairead Maguire; former UN Assistant Secretary General Hans von Sponeck; current UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Richard Falk; and over 100 scholars.
Dear Kenneth Roth,
May 12 2014 "ICH" -  Human Rights Watch characterizes itself as “one of the world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights.” However, HRW's close ties to the U.S. government call into question its independence.
For example, HRW's Washington advocacy director, Tom Malinowski, previously served as a special assistant to President Bill Clinton and as a speechwriter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In 2013, he left HRW after being nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor under John Kerry.
In her HRW.org biography, Board of Directors' Vice Chair Susan Manilow describes herself as "a longtime friend to Bill Clinton" who is "highly involved" in his political party, and "has hosted dozens of events" for the Democratic National Committee.
Currently, HRW Americas' advisory committee includes Myles Frechette, a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, and Michael Shifter, one-time Latin America director for the U.S. government-financed National Endowment for Democracy. Miguel Díaz, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst in the 1990s, sat on HRW Americas' advisory committee from 2003-11. Now at the State Department, Díaz serves as "an interlocutor between the intelligence community and non-government experts."
In his capacity as an HRW advocacy director, Malinowski contended in 2009 that "under limited circumstances" there was "a legitimate place" for CIA renditions—the illegal practice of kidnapping and transferring terrorism suspects around the planet. Malinowski was quoted paraphrasing the U.S. government's argument that designing an alternative to sending suspects to "foreign dungeons to be tortured" was "going to take some time."
HRW has not extended similar consideration to Venezuela. In a 2012 letter to President Chávez, HRW criticized the country's candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, alleging that Venezuela had fallen "far short of acceptable standards" and questioning its "ability to serve as a credible voice on human rights." At no point has U.S. membership in the same council merited censure from HRW, despite Washington's secret, global assassination program, its preservation of renditions, and its illegal detention of individuals at Guantánamo Bay.
Likewise, in February 2013, HRW correctly described as "unlawful" Syria's use of missiles in its civil war. However, HRW remained silent on the clear violation of international law constituted by the U.S. threat of missile strikes on Syria in August.
The few examples above, limited to only recent history, might be forgiven as inconsistencies or oversights that could naturally occur in any large, busy organization. But HRW’s close relationships with the U.S. government suffuse such instances with the appearance of a conflict of interest.
We therefore encourage you to institute immediate, concrete measures to strongly assert HRW's independence. Closing what seems to be a revolving door would be a reasonable first step: Bar those who have crafted or executed U.S. foreign policy from serving as HRW staff, advisors or board members. At a bare minimum, mandate lengthy “cooling-off” periods before and after any associate moves between HRW and that arm of the government.
Your largest donor, investor George Soros, argued in 2010 that "to be more effective, I think the organization has to be seen as more international, less an American organization.” We concur. We urge you to implement the aforementioned proposal to ensure a reputation for genuine independence.
Sincerely,
  1. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize laureate
  2. Mairead Maguire, Nobel Peace Prize laureate
  3. Joel Andreas, Professor of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
  4. Antony Anghie, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah
  5. John M. Archer, Professor of English, New York University
  6. Asma Barlas, Professor of Politics, Director of the Center for the Study of Culture, Race, and Ethnicity, Ithaca College
  7. Rosalyn Baxandall, Professor Emeritus of American Studies, State University of New York-Old Westbury
  8. Marc Becker, Professor of Latin American History, Truman State University
  9. Jason A. Beckett, Professor of Law, American University in Cairo
  10. Angélica Bernal, Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
  11. Keane Bhatt, activist, writer
  12. William Blum, author, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II
  13. Audrey Bomse, Co-chair, National Lawyers Guild Palestine Subcommittee
  14. Patrick Bond, Professor of Development Studies, Director of the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
  15. Michael Brenner, Professor Emeritus of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
  16. Jean Bricmont, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Louvain; author, Humanitarian Imperialism
  17. Renate Bridenthal, Professor Emerita of History, Brooklyn College, CUNY
  18. Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez, Ph.D., author
  19. Paul Buhle, Professor Emeritus of American Civilization, Brown University
  20. David Camfield, Professor of Labour Studies, University of Manitoba
  21. Leonard L. Cavise, Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law
  22. Robert Chernomas, Professor of Economics, University of Manitoba
  23. Aviva Chomsky, Professor of History, Salem State University
  24. George Ciccariello-Maher, Professor of Political Science, Drexel University
  25. Jeff Cohen, Associate Professor of Journalism, Ithaca College
  26. Marjorie Cohn, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
  27. Lisa Duggan, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  28. Carolyn Eisenberg, Professor of History, Hofstra University
  29. Matthew Evangelista, Professor of History and Political Science, Cornell University
  30. Richard Falk, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Princeton University
  31. Sujatha Fernandes, Professor of Sociology, Queens College, CUNY Graduate Center
  32. Mara Fridell, Professor of Sociology, University of Manitoba
  33. Frances Geteles, Professor Emeritus, Department of Special Programs, CUNY City College
  34. Lesley Gill, Professor of Anthropology, Vanderbilt University
  35. Piero Gleijeses, Professor of American Foreign Policy and Latin American Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
  36. Jeff Goodwin, Professor of Sociology, New York University
  37. Katherine Gordy, Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University
  38. Manu Goswami, Professor of History, New York University
  39. Greg Grandin, Professor of History, New York University
  40. Simon Granovsky-Larsen, Professor of Latin American Studies, Centennial College, Toronto
  41. James N. Green, Professor of Latin American History, Brown University
  42. A. Tom Grunfeld, Professor of History, SUNY Empire State College
  43. Julie Guard, Professor of Labor Studies, University of Manitoba
  44. Peter Hallward, Professor of Philosophy, Kingston University; author, Damming the Flood
  45. John L. Hammond, Professor of Sociology, Hunter College, CUNY Graduate Center
  46. Beth Harris, Professor of Politics, Ithaca College
  47. Martin Hart-Landsberg, Professor Economics, Lewis and Clark College
  48. Chris Hedges, journalist; author, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning
  49. Doug Henwood, journalist; author, Wall Street
  50. Edward Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance, University of Pennsylvania; co-author, The Political Economy of Human Rights
  51. Susan Heuman, Ph.D., independent scholar of history
  52. Forrest Hylton, Lecturer in History & Literature, Harvard University
  53. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Professor of American Studies and History, Yale University
  54. Jennifer Jolly, Co-coordinator of Latin American Studies, Ithaca College
  55. Rebecca E. Karl, Professor of History, New York University
  56. J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Professor of Anthropology and American Studies, Wesleyan University
  57. Ari Kelman, Professor of History, University of California, Davis
  58. Arang Keshavarzian, Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University
  59. Laleh Khalili, Professor of Middle East Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
  60. Daniel Kovalik, Professor of International Human Rights, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
  61. Rob Kroes, Professor Emeritus of American Studies, University of Amsterdam
  62. Peter Kuznick, Professor of History, American University
  63. Deborah T. Levenson, Professor of History, Boston College
  64. David Ludden, Professor of History, New York University
  65. Catherine Lutz, Professor of Anthropology and International Studies, Brown University
  66. Arthur MacEwan, Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Boston
  67. Viviana MacManus, Professor of Women's and Gender Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
  68. Chase Madar, civil rights attorney; author, The Passion of [Chelsea] Manning
  69. Alfred W. McCoy, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison
  70. Teresa Meade, Professor of History, Union College
  71. Thomas Murphy, Professor of History and Government, University of Maryland, University College Europe
  72. Allan Nairn, independent investigative journalist
  73. Usha Natarajan, Professor of International Law, American University in Cairo
  74. Diane M. Nelson, Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University
  75. Joseph Nevins, Professor of Geography, Vassar College
  76. Mary Nolan, Professor of History, New York University
  77. Anthony O’Brien, Professor Emeritus of English, Queens College, CUNY
  78. Paul O'Connell, Reader in Law, School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
  79. Christian Parenti, Professor of Sustainable Development, School for International Training Graduate Institute
  80. David Peterson, independent writer and researcher
  81. Adrienne Pine, Professor of Anthropology, American University
  82. Claire Potter, Professor of History, The New School
  83. Margaret Power, Professor of History, Illinois Institute of Technology
  84. Pablo Pozzi, Professor of History, Universidad de Buenos Aires
  85. Gyan Prakash, Professor of History, Princeton University
  86. Vijay Prashad, Edward Said Chair of American Studies, American University of Beirut
  87. Peter Ranis, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, CUNY Graduate Center
  88. Michael Ratner, human rights attorney; author, The Prosecution of Donald Rumsfeld
  89. Sanjay Reddy, Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research
  90. Adolph Reed, Jr., Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
  91. Nazih Richani, Director of Latin American Studies, Kean University
  92. Moss Roberts, Professor of Chinese, New York University
  93. Corey Robin, Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College, CUNY Graduate Center
  94. William I. Robinson, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara
  95. Patricia Rodriguez, Professor of Politics, Ithaca College
  96. Andrew Ross, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  97. Elizabeth Sanders, Professor of Government, Cornell University
  98. Dean Saranillio, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  99. T.M. Scruggs, Professor Emeritus of Music, University of Iowa
  100. Ian J. Seda-Irizarry, Professor of Political Economy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
  101. Denise A. Segura, Professor of Sociology; Chair, Department of Chicana and Chicano Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara
  102. Mark Selden, Senior Research Associate, East Asia Program, Cornell University
  103. Falguni A. Sheth, Professor of Philosophy and Political Theory, Hampshire College
  104. Naoko Shibusawa, Professor of History, Brown University
  105. Dina M. Siddiqi, Professor of Anthropology, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
  106. Francisco Sierra Caballero, Director of the Center for Communication, Politics and Social Change, University of Seville
  107. Brad Simpson, Professor of History, University of Connecticut
  108. Nikhil Pal Singh, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and History, New York University
  109. Leslie Sklair, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, London School of Economics
  110. Norman Solomon, author, War Made Easy
  111. Judy Somberg, Chair, National Lawyers Guild Task Force on the Americas
  112. Jeb Sprague, author, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti
  113. Oliver Stone, filmmaker; co-author, The Untold History of the United States
  114. Steve Striffler, Professor of Anthropology, Chair of Latin American Studies, University of New Orleans
  115. Sinclair Thomson, Professor of History, New York University
  116. Miguel Tinker Salas, Professor of History and Latin American Studies, Pomona College
  117. James S. Uleman, Professor of Psychology, New York University
  118. Alejandro Velasco, Professor of History, New York University
  119. Robert Vitalis, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
  120. Hans Christof von Sponeck, former United Nations Assistant Secretary General (1998-2000)
  121. Hilbourne Watson, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Bucknell University
  122. Barbara Weinstein, Professor of History, New York University
  123. Mark Weisbrot, Ph.D., Co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research
  124. Kirsten Weld, Professor of History, Harvard University
  125. Gregory Wilpert, Ph.D, author, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power
  126. John Womack, Jr., Professor Emeritus of Latin American History and Economics, Harvard University
  127. Michael Yates, Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown
  128. Kevin Young, Ph.D., Latin American History, State University of New York-Stony Brook
  129. Marilyn B. Young, Professor of History, New York University
  130. Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, Professor of History; Co-Director, South Asian Studies, Brown University
  131. Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and Coordinator of Middle Eastern Studies, University of San Francisco
Originally published on: