Saturday 17 May 2014

What is Boko Haram and whence did it arise?



The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls by Boko Haram has outraged the world; particularly after their captors promised to sell the girls as slaves. They are portrayed as Muslim fundamentalists seeking to impose a harsh Sharia Law over the whole of Nigeria. They have murdered over a thousand Nigerians in the past few years and are acting with utter impunity against the pathetic forces arrayed against them by the Nigerian State.

The last sentence highlights the reality of the problem – it is not the rise of Boko Haram which is the problem but the willing inability of the State to confront them and the concomitant complicity of several major political forces in the country in the formation and sustenance of Boko Haram for their own domestic political aims. The complicity of ‘legitimate’ Nigerian political forces in the activities of Boko Haram is a guide as to why the president, Goodluck Johnathan, is afraid to move against Boko Haram in anything more than a token resistance.

Boko Haram emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri led by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2004 it moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called ‘Afghanistan’, and used to attack nearby police outposts, killing mainly police officers. It t started as a cell of the Muslim sect called ‘Jama’atul Ahlus Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihad’ but advertised itself as ‘Boko Haram’ from the Hausa word ‘boko’ meaning “animist, western or otherwise non-Islamic education” and the Arabic word ‘haram’ figuratively meaning “sin” (literally, “forbidden“).

From its earliest days it received support from the Northern Nigerian Muslim political elites. The elites’ power was waning and the Nigerian army, which had always been the backbone for Northern political influence, had been changing into an army dominated by the Middle Belt officers (mainly Tiv). The Northern Fulani military caste was ageing, retiring and withdrawing from military activities. The army was becoming less Muslim and more Christian or Animist, particularly the junior officers. The traditional Northern (mainly Fulani-Hausa and Kanuri) elites were Muslims and represented mainly herders, operating under a system of feudal Emirs or Sardaunas.

A substantial part of the Nigerian North is not Muslim. In areas like Plateau State Christians are in the majority. Christians in the North are primarily agriculturalists while Muslims are herders. For centuries there has been a war between herders and farmers. This is a traditional conflict across Africa as each group seeks to use the rapidly disappearing arable land south of the Sahara. Moreover the Northern Muslim herders have been beset by cattle-raiders from their own side. In the last few years there have been incessant deadly attacks on Fulani (Muslim) settlements and villages in northern Nigeria by armed bandits – largely made up of disgruntled Fulani who themselves have lost cattle. Gangs of heavily armed bandits prowl the vast Dajin Rugu forest which spans several hundred square kilometres across Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna states and Niger State. This is not only a Nigerian problem. In February 2012 alone over 23,000 Fulani herders poured into Cameroon from Nigeria's north-eastern state of Taraba, following deadly clashes with farming communities. Many of the armed bandits are Fulanis who have joined gangs involved in cross-border armed robbery and cattle-rustling in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Senegal and Mali. 
Thousands of herders in northern Nigeria's Kaduna State have fled their homes in 2013 and 2014 following raids by cattle rustlers that killed at least dozens of people. This ugly trend is compounding the dilemma of the Fulani herders who are caught in a vicious cycle of conflict with farmers over-grazing the farmed land of the Christians. It is a situation ripe for manipulation.

There is also a long historical trail to these conflicts. These ethnic conflict groups extend far beyond Nigeria’s borders. The Fulani (Peul) are the remnants of the old Fulani Empire which dominated much of West Africa, and can be found in Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. They are a minority tribe in all but Guinea. The Kanuri (of Bornu State) are the descendants of the Bornu Empire (1380-1893) which was a continuation of the great Kanem Empire founded centuries earlier by the Sayfawa Dynasty. In time it would become even larger than Kanem, incorporating areas that are today parts of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These two Muslim ethnic groups make up the large majority of the members of Boko Haram.

The sense of diminishing power and the concomitant rise to power of the South-South (a term used to refer to the Nigerian states of the South east where the oil is found and has been dominated in the new politics of the region by the Ijaws) was threatening to the Northern elites. The Muslims had been fighting running battles in Plateau State and elsewhere in the North with the largely Christian pastoralists, and they felt their interests would only be maintained in Nigeria through the formula of ‘zoning’, in which state power is divided among the various ethnicities and regions; theoretically sustaining balance.

This was incorporated in the rules which governed the dominant political party PDP, the Peoples Democratic Party. The PDP agreed to ‘rotate’ the presidency, vice-presidency and other key jobs between the North and the South on a regular basis to ensure “fairness” of representation. The fact that Nigeria is composed of more than just North and South was not reflected in the zoning rules. There are many Northern Christians but they don’t count as Northerners in zoning. There are massive competitions for primacy among the large Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups on a national scale and the oil industry in the Delta is a hotbed of competition among the Efiks, Ibibio, Igbo and Ijaws of the Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states; those who were getting very rich on the production of oil.

The Northern elites decided that they would have to insist that there be no third term for Obasanjo, the erstwhile president. They decided that they would put a Northerner (Yar’Adua) in power as the president and head of the PDP party. Goodluck Jonathan was installed as vice-president to ‘balance’ the ticket with a Southerner. But Yar’Adua was very ill and went off to a clinic in Saudi Arabia where he died, leaving Jonathan as President. The North felt that it did not get its full entitlement of power with the death of Yar’Adua. They demanded that a Northerner succeed Goodluck, but Goodluck decided to run again for President. The North took no chances and, while building up a powerful political force inside the PDP and the governorships, they also decided that they would send many Fulani and Kanuri children from the Northern madrassas to Libya and the Middle East for training. Under the pretext of sponsoring youngsters to study in the Middle East, they sent them to terrorist training camps.

Although Boko Haram officially started in 2002 there had been several terrorist activities which preceded it. These young ‘jihadists’ proved their worth to their sponsors and the best of them got overseas scholarships to terrorist schools. In the early months of May 1986, thirty-six Jihadist hardliners went on a rampage, attacking Christian students of the University of Sokoto. According to a participant in that raid in that same week, the Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of General Babangida mobilised the jihadists and provided them with some military vans and army uniforms which they used to start killing innocent and defenceless Christians all over the Northern states. The following year, March 5 1987 to be precise, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida secretly armed the jihadists through one of his close aides by the name of Captain Hassan Abubakar. They attacked Christians and foreigners across Kano and Borno. Their ‘success’ led to them being chosen for training outside Nigeria.

The jihadists claim to have been trained in eight different countries namely Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Egypt and the Niger Republic. They travelled as a group and received basic and advanced training. As proof of the success of their training they sport a mark (tattoo) showing proficiency. The mark is in the form of a sword held in a hand. Those who went through the training regard it as the ‘license to kill for Allah’. They included Ali Baba Nur, Asari Dokubo, Jasper Akinbo, Mohammed Yusuf, Salisu Maigari, Danlami Abubakar, Cletus Okar, Ali Qaqa, Maigari Haliru and Asabe Dantala.

The raids on Christians increased. The militancy exhibited by the leaders brought out a lot of support from Northern youth. This was not entirely because they had become hard-line jihadists but mainly because the substantial financial support from the Northern Emirs, General Babangida, the Northern governors and the Northern PDP political and business elite made jihadism a career choice. As the Christians fought back, it became easier to recruit jihadists.

One of the key demands of Boko Haram is the creation of a Muslim state in Nigeria which would be governed by the Sharia Law. The question of the legal co-existence of a Sharia law system in parallel with Nigerian civil law was raised in 1999 when the civil government of the former General Obasanjo had begun under a new constitution. Islamic law was allowed to exist under the British but elected Nigerian governments after independence did not recognise Islamic law as equal to civil law or binding on citizens unless they wanted to be so bound.

Despite many misgivings, in 2000, several states were given the option to use Sharia law. Since 1999 Sharia has been instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law in the Muslim-majority and in some parts of three Muslim-plurality states for Muslim citizens. In 2002, in defiance of the authorities in Oyo State, the Supreme Council of Sharia carried out a ceremony in Ibadan's central mosque to inaugurate a panel to rule on civil matters in the region; to be empowered to decide on matters such as marriage, divorce and land disputes. The extension of Sharia law to a southern Christian state (actually the West) was a bold move by the Muslims. It was strongly rejected by Christians. What they objected to mostly was the cruel punishments of stoning to death and cutting of hands of the convicted as part of Sharia.

The Muslims of the North, despite their religious preference for Sharia were also appalled by the primitive punishments being applied. They were attracted to Sharia for different reasons. The Nigerian civil administration has always been riddled with corruption and injustice. Justice is a commodity not a birth right. They viewed the Sharia law as practised by their neighbours and religious co-believers as more likely to be fair and timely than a disinterested civil administration which was not inherently fair or just. The predilection for Sharia law was a powerful boost to the jihadists.

The militancy of Boko Haram was muted under the short presidency of Yar’Adua, a scion of one of the most powerful Northern families. He kept Northern political hegemony in power and most of his close associates were from the Northern elites. They kept Boko Haram in check. However, Yar’Adua was far more ill than anyone knew and died during his first term after a protracted stay in a Saudi hospital. His Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan became the accidental president; much as he had become the accidental Governor of Bayelsa when his mentor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the Governor was forced from office in 2005.
In 2007 Jonathan was vice-president and in 2010, at the death of Yar’Adua, he became president. In the meteoric rise to the top he had very little chance to pick up the skills and abilities needed for the job, especially in dealing with political sophisticates like Babangida, Obasanjo, Aliyu Gusau and David Mark; all of whom had years of plotting, coup-making and intrigue behind them. Those who could have helped him, like General T.Y. Danjuma, were ignored and isolated. Jonathan has bungled his way in the presidency ever since. His cardinal sin, in the eyes of the North, was to run for president on his own instead of allowing a Northerner in to finish the ‘Northern turn’ cut short by the death of Yar’Adua. On 18 May 2010, the National Assembly approved Jonathan's nomination of former Kaduna State governor Namadi Sambo, an architect, for the position of vice- president.

With Jonathan’s election as president in his own right Northerners turned up the heat on the government by activating Boko Haram. There have been bombs, church-burnings, communal violence and a campaign to cause havoc in the country. The stated vow of Boko Haram has been to make Nigeria ungovernable. This is an amusing thought as there are very few Nigerians who have ever operated under the delusion that Nigeria has ever been governable. In 1965 there was widespread violence in the West as the Action Party turned on itself and killed large numbers of Yoruba. The Biafran War followed with the Igbo being driven from the North and calamitous battles fought between the two forces which left the East in famine and disease. Years of military rule followed, where kleptocracy and corruption thrived, even during a brief interlude of civilian rule. The roads have deteriorated and become largely impassable. There is no good drinking water in rural areas and in most cities. Boreholes which were paid for have never been drilled. Rural electricity has suffered from widespread theft of copper wire; blackouts of electricity are frequent and generators the rule. The creeks are polluted with oil spills. The rail system has largely disappeared, universities are frequently in a state of strike; hospitals are without medicines and refineries barely function. What is it that Boko Haram can do to make Nigeria ungovernable?

What Boko Haram has found, much to the displeasure of the self-appointed Northern elites, is that there are a very large number of Christians in the North. Other than in three states there is a large Christian presence; a presence which is being activated by the open support of the Northern elites; a Christian presence which is gathering its forces together to repel the excesses of Boko Haram and Sharia. The Igbo are sending buses to the north to bring back Igbo and Muslims of the South are starting a trek northwards, but these are trivial movements. There is nothing in the Northern economy which even hints at an ability to survive without the South and its oil revenues. The North needs the South but the South doesn’t need the North.

The whole edifice of what passes for governance in Nigeria is grounded upon the production of oil and the theft of its revenues. There is very little productive industry or agriculture in the North which will sustain its populace in food and jobs without a regular and hefty payment of money to the Northern states by the Federal Government from revenues derived from the oil industry.

The fundamental issue of this revenue sharing is the implementation of the ‘derivation principle’. After the ravages of the Biafran War the country was reunited. The vast oil wealth of the Delta was distributed by the Federal Government using a formula which divided the national revenue derived from the oil industry equally among the states. Each state in the Federation receives a notionally equal share of the oil revenue (since 1995 set at 13% for each state) from the Federal Government. So, in theory, each state of the North gets 13% of the revenue even though the oil is actually produced in the states of the South-South who see the oil as ‘theirs’. Unfortunately their territory is effectively the same area as the defeated Biafran State so they had little choice. Under military governments the derivation formula was set at 10%. It is crucial to the Northern states that they receive the money from the derivation principle and the presidency of a South-South politician is a risk which seems threatening to them; hence the reliance on zoning.

The South-South states have their own ‘terrorist’ problems with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and those who terrorise the oil industry in the Delta. The terrorists of the Delta were similar to those in the North without the religious baggage, as MEND and the Delta militants were created and funded by the political elites of the South-South for their own ends. In many cases the actual leadership of these two groups, Boko Haram and MEND, were trained together in Libya at the same terrorist school in Benghazi.

The earliest groups to form were MEND and the Delta militants. They were funded by the South-South governors of Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa states and their political allies to make it difficult for the forces of law and order (the ‘Kill and Go’ police and the Task Force) to interfere with the stealing of oil in the region; known in Nigeria as ‘bunkering’. Every day the Nigerian economy loses between 150,000 and 320,000 barrels of oil. These are stolen by 'bunkerers', who have small tanker vessels which load the oil in the Delta and tranship this stolen oil to offshore tankers which deliver this stolen oil to other West African states. In addition to the theft of crude oil, other inland illegal tanker trucks load the imported refined products and drive these into neighbouring countries for black market sale. At $100 a barrel that amounts to around US$30 million a day for crude oil and around US$8 million per day for gasoline (PMS) and diesel. In short the bunkering of oil and refined products in the South-South brings in an illegal $42 million a day or over US$12 billion a year.

This illegal trade was pioneered under President Abacha when Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe and his naval colleagues Victor Ombu and Ibrahim Ogohi established the smuggling of petroleum products from Port Harcourt and Warri to neighbouring West African countries. This naval assistance was important as over fifty vessels were engaged in the bunkering.

Soon the conflict between the military and the ‘terrorists’ took over the news and public attention. The issues of losing USD$12 billion a year to theft receded in public (and international) consciousness as the battles with MEND and the others took their attention. The international oil companies in the Delta, other than for the periodic inconvenience of the occasional kidnapping and ransom of staffs, were not terribly concerned, largely because most of the terrorist activities were concentrated on-shore and in the creeks. The international oil companies have production-sharing agreements with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which delivers the major part of the oil revenues for onshore production to the NNPC. For oil garnered from deep water production the oil companies receive around 60% of the revenue. They are financially better off delivering crude from their deep water wells so were not terribly concerned by the shutdowns of onshore production by MEND or anyone else.

Within a relatively short period of time and lots of publicity these terrorist groups of the South-South were ‘settled’ – a Nigerian term which signifies the transfer of cash for a designated behaviour. In several states the South-South governors continued to fund the militants, who also acted as their election agents, ‘Area Boys’. The militant leader of MEND, Asari Dokubo, was a graduate of the Benghazi school and was imprisoned for a while in Abuja. He is free and many of the MEND arms suppliers (primarily in South Africa and Angola) are back in business but at a lower level of activity. Their common nom de guerre, Jomo Gbomo, makes their public pronouncements. Henry Okah of MEND was arrested in Angola and brought to trial in a sealed courtroom (under Yar’Adua), and released. ‘General’ Boyloaf, who had taken over was also settled and they both resumed a less adventurous life.

Goodluck Johnathan was the Governor of Bayelsa State before becoming President and was not unfamiliar with the workings of MEND and the Delta ‘terrorists’. It is a cash cow for the South-South leadership and a ready-made political force. It is justified by alluding to the fact that this is ‘their’ oil so they have found a way to make more for themselves than under the derivation principle. Boko Haram was seen as the Northern equivalent of MEND.

The problem arose when the Al Qaida groups operating along the Sahel made contact with Boko Haram and introduced foreign fighters into their midst with little respect for the wishes of the Northern elites which continued to fund and arm them. Their ideology was a bit extreme for the more practical Northern elites but Boko Haram soon grew bigger than they could control. It operated on international jihadi principles. The Northern leaders still deal with Boko Haram as a buffer for their political adventures. Boko Haram is still useful to them. After the abduction of the girls, the Northern elders used the president’s inability to catch them to issue a declaration saying that Goodluck Jonathan had lost his bearings and had failed in his most solemn responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Nigerians. Therefore, power must return to the North in 2015. The position of the Northern elders is clear – Johnathan must not run in 2015 and a Northerner must become president.

There is no shortage of self-appointed Northern saviours. Former Vice-President Atiku is convinced he was short changed by Obasanjo in his effort to succeed him. David Mark wants to use his key role as president of the Senate for the job and sees the presidency as his next logical step in his collection of titles. Perhaps the most worrying is Aliyu Gusau, the former National Security Director and now Minister of Defence. He has always stated that one day he will be president and he hasn’t given up on his ambition. There was a fury in the country over Jonathan’s appointment of Gusau as Defence Minister. Although he was a General, the army despises him and tried to get him fired as soon as he was appointed. It wasn’t an ideological call. Gusau was one of the key people arranging arms for Boko Haram and, at the same time, keeping the Nigerian army very short of bullets and supplies. The army refused to meet with him when he was appointed, but eventually Jonathan forced them to meet. Gusau continues to play a much compromised role in this business and has been one of the key impediments to allowing foreign assistance to the Boko Haram incursions.

Jonathan is afraid of him and, at the same time, hopes Aliyu Gusau will act as a bridge for him to his Northern friends and sponsors. This is not a government with any principles, direction or conscience. There is nothing the Nigerian Government is going to do to resolve the Boko Haram problem. They have too much at stake financially to make a real effort and the military is too weak.

However there is a solution which is being considered. Over a third of the Nigerian army is serving outside of Nigeria as peacekeepers in other parts of Africa (Mali, Sudan CAR, Niger, etc.). They are fully armed and they are very hostile to Boko Haram and what they stand for. They are led primarily by Middle Belt officers and are now engaged in meetings to decide how to proceed. The problem isn’t lack of will but in overcoming the pressure for a ’Colonel’s Coup’ as opposed to a ‘General’s Coup’. This is being worked on now. There is a high likelihood that the civilian government in Nigeria will change soon as a response to the failures of politicians to agree on even the most basic policies. It will be no surprise when the green in Nigeria’s flag is once again khaki green.

* Dr. Gary K. Busch is an international trade unionist, an academic, a businessman and a political affairs and business consultant for 40 years.


Originally posted on: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/91745

Monday 12 May 2014

Nobel Peace Laureates to Human Rights Watch: Close Your Revolving Door to U.S. Government




The leading human rights organization's close ties to the U.S. government call its independence into question.
By Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Mairead Maguire
The following letter was sent to Human Rights Watch's Kenneth Roth on behalf of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Mairead Maguire; former UN Assistant Secretary General Hans von Sponeck; current UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Richard Falk; and over 100 scholars.
Dear Kenneth Roth,
May 12 2014 "ICH" -  Human Rights Watch characterizes itself as “one of the world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights.” However, HRW's close ties to the U.S. government call into question its independence.
For example, HRW's Washington advocacy director, Tom Malinowski, previously served as a special assistant to President Bill Clinton and as a speechwriter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In 2013, he left HRW after being nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor under John Kerry.
In her HRW.org biography, Board of Directors' Vice Chair Susan Manilow describes herself as "a longtime friend to Bill Clinton" who is "highly involved" in his political party, and "has hosted dozens of events" for the Democratic National Committee.
Currently, HRW Americas' advisory committee includes Myles Frechette, a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, and Michael Shifter, one-time Latin America director for the U.S. government-financed National Endowment for Democracy. Miguel Díaz, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst in the 1990s, sat on HRW Americas' advisory committee from 2003-11. Now at the State Department, Díaz serves as "an interlocutor between the intelligence community and non-government experts."
In his capacity as an HRW advocacy director, Malinowski contended in 2009 that "under limited circumstances" there was "a legitimate place" for CIA renditions—the illegal practice of kidnapping and transferring terrorism suspects around the planet. Malinowski was quoted paraphrasing the U.S. government's argument that designing an alternative to sending suspects to "foreign dungeons to be tortured" was "going to take some time."
HRW has not extended similar consideration to Venezuela. In a 2012 letter to President Chávez, HRW criticized the country's candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, alleging that Venezuela had fallen "far short of acceptable standards" and questioning its "ability to serve as a credible voice on human rights." At no point has U.S. membership in the same council merited censure from HRW, despite Washington's secret, global assassination program, its preservation of renditions, and its illegal detention of individuals at Guantánamo Bay.
Likewise, in February 2013, HRW correctly described as "unlawful" Syria's use of missiles in its civil war. However, HRW remained silent on the clear violation of international law constituted by the U.S. threat of missile strikes on Syria in August.
The few examples above, limited to only recent history, might be forgiven as inconsistencies or oversights that could naturally occur in any large, busy organization. But HRW’s close relationships with the U.S. government suffuse such instances with the appearance of a conflict of interest.
We therefore encourage you to institute immediate, concrete measures to strongly assert HRW's independence. Closing what seems to be a revolving door would be a reasonable first step: Bar those who have crafted or executed U.S. foreign policy from serving as HRW staff, advisors or board members. At a bare minimum, mandate lengthy “cooling-off” periods before and after any associate moves between HRW and that arm of the government.
Your largest donor, investor George Soros, argued in 2010 that "to be more effective, I think the organization has to be seen as more international, less an American organization.” We concur. We urge you to implement the aforementioned proposal to ensure a reputation for genuine independence.
Sincerely,
  1. Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize laureate
  2. Mairead Maguire, Nobel Peace Prize laureate
  3. Joel Andreas, Professor of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
  4. Antony Anghie, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah
  5. John M. Archer, Professor of English, New York University
  6. Asma Barlas, Professor of Politics, Director of the Center for the Study of Culture, Race, and Ethnicity, Ithaca College
  7. Rosalyn Baxandall, Professor Emeritus of American Studies, State University of New York-Old Westbury
  8. Marc Becker, Professor of Latin American History, Truman State University
  9. Jason A. Beckett, Professor of Law, American University in Cairo
  10. Angélica Bernal, Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
  11. Keane Bhatt, activist, writer
  12. William Blum, author, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II
  13. Audrey Bomse, Co-chair, National Lawyers Guild Palestine Subcommittee
  14. Patrick Bond, Professor of Development Studies, Director of the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
  15. Michael Brenner, Professor Emeritus of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
  16. Jean Bricmont, Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Louvain; author, Humanitarian Imperialism
  17. Renate Bridenthal, Professor Emerita of History, Brooklyn College, CUNY
  18. Fernando Buen Abad Domínguez, Ph.D., author
  19. Paul Buhle, Professor Emeritus of American Civilization, Brown University
  20. David Camfield, Professor of Labour Studies, University of Manitoba
  21. Leonard L. Cavise, Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law
  22. Robert Chernomas, Professor of Economics, University of Manitoba
  23. Aviva Chomsky, Professor of History, Salem State University
  24. George Ciccariello-Maher, Professor of Political Science, Drexel University
  25. Jeff Cohen, Associate Professor of Journalism, Ithaca College
  26. Marjorie Cohn, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law
  27. Lisa Duggan, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  28. Carolyn Eisenberg, Professor of History, Hofstra University
  29. Matthew Evangelista, Professor of History and Political Science, Cornell University
  30. Richard Falk, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Princeton University
  31. Sujatha Fernandes, Professor of Sociology, Queens College, CUNY Graduate Center
  32. Mara Fridell, Professor of Sociology, University of Manitoba
  33. Frances Geteles, Professor Emeritus, Department of Special Programs, CUNY City College
  34. Lesley Gill, Professor of Anthropology, Vanderbilt University
  35. Piero Gleijeses, Professor of American Foreign Policy and Latin American Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
  36. Jeff Goodwin, Professor of Sociology, New York University
  37. Katherine Gordy, Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University
  38. Manu Goswami, Professor of History, New York University
  39. Greg Grandin, Professor of History, New York University
  40. Simon Granovsky-Larsen, Professor of Latin American Studies, Centennial College, Toronto
  41. James N. Green, Professor of Latin American History, Brown University
  42. A. Tom Grunfeld, Professor of History, SUNY Empire State College
  43. Julie Guard, Professor of Labor Studies, University of Manitoba
  44. Peter Hallward, Professor of Philosophy, Kingston University; author, Damming the Flood
  45. John L. Hammond, Professor of Sociology, Hunter College, CUNY Graduate Center
  46. Beth Harris, Professor of Politics, Ithaca College
  47. Martin Hart-Landsberg, Professor Economics, Lewis and Clark College
  48. Chris Hedges, journalist; author, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning
  49. Doug Henwood, journalist; author, Wall Street
  50. Edward Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance, University of Pennsylvania; co-author, The Political Economy of Human Rights
  51. Susan Heuman, Ph.D., independent scholar of history
  52. Forrest Hylton, Lecturer in History & Literature, Harvard University
  53. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Professor of American Studies and History, Yale University
  54. Jennifer Jolly, Co-coordinator of Latin American Studies, Ithaca College
  55. Rebecca E. Karl, Professor of History, New York University
  56. J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Professor of Anthropology and American Studies, Wesleyan University
  57. Ari Kelman, Professor of History, University of California, Davis
  58. Arang Keshavarzian, Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University
  59. Laleh Khalili, Professor of Middle East Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
  60. Daniel Kovalik, Professor of International Human Rights, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
  61. Rob Kroes, Professor Emeritus of American Studies, University of Amsterdam
  62. Peter Kuznick, Professor of History, American University
  63. Deborah T. Levenson, Professor of History, Boston College
  64. David Ludden, Professor of History, New York University
  65. Catherine Lutz, Professor of Anthropology and International Studies, Brown University
  66. Arthur MacEwan, Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Boston
  67. Viviana MacManus, Professor of Women's and Gender Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
  68. Chase Madar, civil rights attorney; author, The Passion of [Chelsea] Manning
  69. Alfred W. McCoy, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison
  70. Teresa Meade, Professor of History, Union College
  71. Thomas Murphy, Professor of History and Government, University of Maryland, University College Europe
  72. Allan Nairn, independent investigative journalist
  73. Usha Natarajan, Professor of International Law, American University in Cairo
  74. Diane M. Nelson, Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University
  75. Joseph Nevins, Professor of Geography, Vassar College
  76. Mary Nolan, Professor of History, New York University
  77. Anthony O’Brien, Professor Emeritus of English, Queens College, CUNY
  78. Paul O'Connell, Reader in Law, School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
  79. Christian Parenti, Professor of Sustainable Development, School for International Training Graduate Institute
  80. David Peterson, independent writer and researcher
  81. Adrienne Pine, Professor of Anthropology, American University
  82. Claire Potter, Professor of History, The New School
  83. Margaret Power, Professor of History, Illinois Institute of Technology
  84. Pablo Pozzi, Professor of History, Universidad de Buenos Aires
  85. Gyan Prakash, Professor of History, Princeton University
  86. Vijay Prashad, Edward Said Chair of American Studies, American University of Beirut
  87. Peter Ranis, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, CUNY Graduate Center
  88. Michael Ratner, human rights attorney; author, The Prosecution of Donald Rumsfeld
  89. Sanjay Reddy, Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research
  90. Adolph Reed, Jr., Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
  91. Nazih Richani, Director of Latin American Studies, Kean University
  92. Moss Roberts, Professor of Chinese, New York University
  93. Corey Robin, Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College, CUNY Graduate Center
  94. William I. Robinson, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara
  95. Patricia Rodriguez, Professor of Politics, Ithaca College
  96. Andrew Ross, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  97. Elizabeth Sanders, Professor of Government, Cornell University
  98. Dean Saranillio, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis, New York University
  99. T.M. Scruggs, Professor Emeritus of Music, University of Iowa
  100. Ian J. Seda-Irizarry, Professor of Political Economy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
  101. Denise A. Segura, Professor of Sociology; Chair, Department of Chicana and Chicano Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara
  102. Mark Selden, Senior Research Associate, East Asia Program, Cornell University
  103. Falguni A. Sheth, Professor of Philosophy and Political Theory, Hampshire College
  104. Naoko Shibusawa, Professor of History, Brown University
  105. Dina M. Siddiqi, Professor of Anthropology, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
  106. Francisco Sierra Caballero, Director of the Center for Communication, Politics and Social Change, University of Seville
  107. Brad Simpson, Professor of History, University of Connecticut
  108. Nikhil Pal Singh, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and History, New York University
  109. Leslie Sklair, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, London School of Economics
  110. Norman Solomon, author, War Made Easy
  111. Judy Somberg, Chair, National Lawyers Guild Task Force on the Americas
  112. Jeb Sprague, author, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti
  113. Oliver Stone, filmmaker; co-author, The Untold History of the United States
  114. Steve Striffler, Professor of Anthropology, Chair of Latin American Studies, University of New Orleans
  115. Sinclair Thomson, Professor of History, New York University
  116. Miguel Tinker Salas, Professor of History and Latin American Studies, Pomona College
  117. James S. Uleman, Professor of Psychology, New York University
  118. Alejandro Velasco, Professor of History, New York University
  119. Robert Vitalis, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
  120. Hans Christof von Sponeck, former United Nations Assistant Secretary General (1998-2000)
  121. Hilbourne Watson, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Bucknell University
  122. Barbara Weinstein, Professor of History, New York University
  123. Mark Weisbrot, Ph.D., Co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research
  124. Kirsten Weld, Professor of History, Harvard University
  125. Gregory Wilpert, Ph.D, author, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power
  126. John Womack, Jr., Professor Emeritus of Latin American History and Economics, Harvard University
  127. Michael Yates, Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown
  128. Kevin Young, Ph.D., Latin American History, State University of New York-Stony Brook
  129. Marilyn B. Young, Professor of History, New York University
  130. Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, Professor of History; Co-Director, South Asian Studies, Brown University
  131. Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics and Coordinator of Middle Eastern Studies, University of San Francisco
Originally published on: 

Friday 18 April 2014

Ethiopia’s Fragmented Elites: Origins and Syndromes By Messay Kebede (PhD.)


One question that regularly and intensely consumes the mind of many Ethiopians is the question of knowing why Ethiopian elites are unable to work together. Especially those opposing the TPLF regime, even though they are well aware that the regime is their common enemy, invariably prove unable to agree on a common political agenda, let alone to act in concert to remove their common foe. Is the failure to act jointly due to irrational forces or is it the outcome of definite causes that are susceptible of a rational explanation? This paper is an attempt to rationally comprehend the failure, with the hope that some such comprehension will have a liberating impact, obvious as it is that the conscious awareness of the forces of division is liable to significantly reduce their grip on the mind of Ethiopian elites.
The first answer that springs to mind to the question why Ethiopian elites are unable to work together is, of course, the lack of unity. But the latter is more of a question than an answer. For, why is there such a deficiency of unity? Why are elites, despite their enduring frustration toward the regime, nay their recurring conviction that the regime is leading the country to chaos, incapable of overcoming their divisions?
The seriousness of the matter forces us to look for causes transcending the immediate preoccupations of Ethiopian elites, the very ones having to do with historical reasons. I submit that the most compelling causes are historical in that the lack of unity is a product of the ideological and political struggles since the dawn of the Ethiopian process of modernization. Let me explain.
Socio-Historical Causes
The appearance of a centralized and oppressive government and its ever-tightening grip over the country as essential ingredients of the Ethiopian process of modernization have entailed a growing rivalry over the control of power and wealth among old and emerging elites. As the progress of modernization modified the Ethiopian social fabric, the rivalry intensified. It reached its peak in the 60s when the conflict between the old nobility and the imperial state on the one hand and the various modern sectors (students, intellectuals, the emerging bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic and military elites, etc.) on the other hand increasingly took a political and ideological form.
Where there is no enough wealth, state power becomes the privileged instrument to exclude competitors. The need to exclude generates, in turn, radical ideologies either in the form of hardened conservatism or extreme revolutionarism. The function of radical ideologies is to justify the political exclusion of opponents. Thus, to the conservatism of the nobility and the imperial state in the 60s and early 70s, students and intellectuals opposed socialism and ethnonationalism. The ideology of socialism allows elites to claim that they are the sole representatives of the working people, thereby depriving other competing elites of the right to represent the overwhelming majority of the people. As to ethnonationalism, it restricts the right to represent a given ethnic group to native elites, and so denies all political legitimacy to non-kin elites. Unsurprisingly, both ideologies justify absolute power as necessary to effect the exclusion.
The characteristics of a state whose function is to exclude rivals are quite different from a democratic state. In the latter, not only conflicts are recognized, but they are also provided with the means of reaching an accommodation based on the verdict of the people. The provision of accommodation prevents the recourse to violence to settle disputes. By contrast, the excluding state rejects all form of accommodation, leaving to opponents no other choice than the overthrow of the state by violent means.
This politics of exclusion foments a culture of confrontation pursuing a zero-sum game. The fact that winners take all, in addition to exasperating the conflicts between elites, inaugurates an endless cycle of violent confrontations during which one group overthrows the ruling elite until it is itself overthrown by another group and so on. The intensification of conflicts undermines the unity of the country and, most of all, weakens the ability of elites to work together by fostering a culture of mutual animosity and mistrust. As a result, the effort to generate a democratic state is repeatedly foiled. Clearly, these characteristics trace an accurate portrait of the Ethiopian state and elites.
The main drawback of a state practicing exclusion is the lack of legitimacy. One group subduing other groups by means of force does not mean that the subdued groups recognize the authority of the state and are willing to obey. On the contrary, the groups are in a state of permanent rebellion and are just waiting for the opportunity to reverse the situation in their favor. However, their expectation makes victims of the lack of legitimacy of the state by nurturing an anarchic idea of entitlement to power. Indeed, where the state lacks legitimacy, many individuals feel entitled to aspire for the ownership of power. This aspiration stands in the way of the effort to create a collaborative spirit among elites by ignite mistrust and rivalry.
A pertinent illustration of fragmentation is the tendency to create parties revolving around individuals rather than being based on ideas and goals. Nothing better confirms the truth of this analysis than the anarchic proliferation of parties in Ethiopia whose number is estimated to be more than eighty. Worse yet, these parties have the tendency to split into smaller parties because disagreements cannot be managed democratically. Given that influential individuals consider political parties as their private possession, they are apt to create a splinter party by walking away with their followers each time internal disputes arise.
Extraverted Psyche
One must not forget that the flourishing of radical ideologies in Ethiopia is a direct consequence of modern education. Insofar as a system of education alien to the country’s history and culture has shaped modern Ethiopian elites, it has greatly facilitated the absorption of imported ideologies. The main outcome of Western education is not only to undermine the inherited common culture, but it is also to inculcate the paradigm of modernity versus tradition. The weakening of the common culture lessens unity while the paradigm of modernity values imitativeness by advocating the rejection of whatever is traditional as uncivilized, backward and by painting Western countries as the model to follow.
This copyism or extraverted psyche is one of the reasons why the modern educated sector of Ethiopian society easily adopted Marxism-Leninism, which was the dominant ideology in the 60s and early 70s. The Marxist-Leninist definition of political struggle as a resolute elimination of rivals, as opposed to the accommodative stand of democracy, became the rule for Ethiopian elites, while ideological radicalization further exasperated their conflicts to the point where they were perceived as irreconcilable. The high point of these antagonistic relationships was none other than the insidious proliferation of ethnonationalism among the educated elites.
The Lack of Galvanizing Ideas
The progressive decline of the fascination with Marxism-Leninism as a result of repeated economic and political failures of socialist countries and the prevalence of liberal democracy constitute an additional reason for the fragmentation of elites. The undeniable power of Marxism-Leninism was that it was a galvanizing ideology in that it identified the interests of elites with the liberation and empowerment of the working masses. The identification provided a nationalist vision investing elites, especially students and intellectuals, with the electrifying mission of becoming the liberators of the masses from oppression and exploitation and of their country from imperialism. Liberalism offers none of the excitements associated with revolutionary goals.
True, liberalism can inspire a fervent defense of freedom that can be as revolutionary as the idea of socialism. But we must see it in the context of Ethiopia, that is, of a mentality not yet emancipated from the totalitarian doctrine of the 60s. Such a mentality could not but amalgamate liberalism with Leninism, the outcome of which is the confusion of liberalism with individualism. The attempt to combine ethnonationalism with liberal principles, as sadly exemplified by the ruling ideology of the TPLF, is the worst form of the confusion.
The amalgam tries to apply liberalism while suppressing freedom in all its manifestations because of the Leninist remnant of politics defined as exclusion of opponents. Together with the caricature of liberalism by those who control power, there spreads among elites the interpretation of liberalism in the direction of selfish individualism. For this distorted liberalism, individuals should not be concerned about other people; their only worry should be their own interests so that all pursuit of grand causes is devalued. Clearly, where egoistic individualism becomes the norm, unity of purpose among elites is difficult to achieve.
In Ethiopia, the unity of purpose has been seriously hindered both by the proliferation of ethnonationalist ideologies and by the inability to find a matching or counter ideology against ethnonationalism. The choice is reduced to being either a supporter, an opponent, or a resigned tolerant of ethnonationalism. The perversion of Ethiopia with ethnonationalist ideologies is a stumbling block to the formation of a common purpose if only because the threat to the integrity of the nation deprives competitors of a common cause. Since elites rejecting the Ethiopian nationhood aspire either to secede or to become dominant, they cannot work together with those who defend the unity of the nation, still less can they accept an all-embracing ideology.
Divide-and-Rule Strategy and the Politics of Fear
Given that the fragmentation of Ethiopian elites along ethnic lines is the work of the TPLF, it follows that the main culprit for the lack of unity is the TPLF regime itself. It is important to note here that the TPLF did not only divide Ethiopia along ethnic states, but it also opted for a terrorist method of government, the essential function of which is the inculcation of fear. Government by fear has a paralyzing effect: though the overwhelming majority of elites is set against the regime, it cannot act in concert to get rid of the regime because of the paralyzing effect of fear. Instead of action, resignation takes the lead with the consequence that the dislike of the regime never transcends the subjective realm of feelings so as to translate into political action.
Be it noted that one of the effects of fear is the propensity to justify the postponement of political action. Indeed, fear provides justification for not acting together by enhancing little differences to the level of a fundamental disagreement. To the question of why opponents do not act together to remove the regime, the ready answer is the absence of agreement. Magnifying minor differences is how fear camouflaged itself into a valid reason for not acting, thereby avoiding the risks and dangers implied in political action. Not only does fear paralyze, but it also inspires fragmentation as a way of deferring political action. It is because dictatorial governments know that elites broken by fear cannot act in concert that they resort to systematic campaigns designed to spread fear.
In default of promoting action, fear encourages wishful thinking. Terror induces hope but in the form of magic or fantasy. Evidence of this is the recurrent predication of an imminent collapse of the regime by many opponents. By underestimating the strength and survival capacity of the regime, they tell us that it is on its last legs, though nothing is being done to turn the hope into reality. This kind of magical faith is another way of avoiding the risks and sacrifices necessary to actually remove the regime. There is some consolation in doing nothing when it is believed that magical forces are bound to intervene in our favor.
Beyond the Humiliated Generation
All the defects hampering rival elites pertain to a generation that has gone through the bitter experience of defeat and humiliation. The dreams of the generation of the 60s and early 70s have been squashed by the victory of the Derg whose dictatorial rule decimated its morale and that of their offspring. Both were offered nothing but the humiliation of a massive exodus. Whether they stayed in the country or left, all experienced another cycle of humiliating events when they witnessed, powerless, the defeat of the Ethiopian army, the invasion of the country by an ethnic army, and the secession of Eritrea. It is hard not to infer from these events a severe damage to Ethiopian nationalism and an erosion of self-confidence such that the generation’s belief in its ability to accomplish great things has received a deadly blow. Without self-confidence, the readiness to unite for a great cause is also likely to suffer gravely.
Defeat and humiliation entail leadership crisis. Just as a defeated army questions the competence of its commanding officers, so too a vanquished generation loses faith in leadership. Once leadership is distrusted, the willingness to unite in an organization is drastically reduced. No less than the need to accomplish great goals, confidence in leaders is a requirement of unity. Without exaggeration, leadership crisis is one of the crucial setbacks of post-revolutionary Ethiopia, all the more so as the Ethiopian culture is prone to the cult of heroes, as witnessed by the fact that its past history shows that the death or the exceptional courage of leaders often determined  the fate of wars.
It would be naive to expect from a wounded generation the solutions to Ethiopia’s numerous problems. What was ruined by one generation cannot be fixed by the same generation. True change requires, above all, culture change, which takes time because it is a matter of creativity and growth. In short, real change is a generational issue. The TPLF, secessionist groups, and their opponents are all products of the dominant culture of the 60s. Their collaborations and conflicts show that society follows a determined path until it sees a precipice. The generation that takes the precipice as a precipice, and not as a redress of a vile social order, is the one called upon to change the direction. It sees an impasse in what other characterize as positive or negative developments.
When things go wrong, the culprits and their opponents are the two poles of the same reality. To the extent that the thinking of the one is just the opposite of the other, they are one and the same, as they remain tied to each other by their very contradiction. Thus, as action and reaction, the Derg and the TPLF are one and the same. That is why many of the actions of the TPLF often give us the impression of a déjà vu. That is why also, just as the Derg, the TPLF is unable to solve the problems of Ethiopia.
The generation that is free of the thinking uniting the Derg and the TPLF is alone able to bring real change to Ethiopia. However, the condition of its emancipation grows from the previous opposition, the development of which draws the limit beyond which the precipice lies. Reaching the limit clears the ground for the new, for “where danger is, also grows the saving power,” as says Heidegger. Whether such a generation is in sight is hard to tell. One thing is sure, though: the best that the defeated generation and perhaps their immediate descendant can do is to take a hard critical look at themselves and exchange their ambition to remain makers of history for the much more subdued role of midwife of the coming repaired generation.

Messay Kebede is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dayton in Ohio. He taught philosophy at Addis Ababa University from 1976 to 1993. He also served as chair of the department of philosophy from 1980 to 1991.


formerly published on : http://cyberethiopia.com/2013/?p=450
 

Thursday 20 March 2014

Impressive:Putin address 18 March 2014




Address by President of the Russian Federation on events in The Ukraine / Crimea

Vladimir Putin

President Putin's address - dubbed in English.
Treaty signing ceremony - No translation needed.
Federation Council members, State Duma deputies, good afternoon. Representatives of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are here among us, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol!

Preliminary remarks on shared history and some numbers

Dear friends, we have gathered here today in connection with an issue that is of vital, historic significance to all of us. A referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance with democratic procedures and international norms.
More than 82 percent of the electorate took part in the vote. Over 96 percent of them spoke out in favour of reuniting with Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.
To understand the reason behind such a choice it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other.
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptised. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilisation and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour.
Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith.
Incidentally, the total population of the Crimean Peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom almost 1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language, and about 290,000-300,000 are Crimean Tatars, who, as the referendum has shown, also lean towards Russia.
True, there was a time when Crimean Tatars were treated unfairly, just as a number of other peoples in the USSR. There is only one thing I can say here: millions of people of various ethnicities suffered during those repressions, and primarily Russians.
Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland. I believe we should make all the necessary political and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars, restore them in their rights and clear their good name.
We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

Twentieth century traumas and the dissolution of the USSR

Colleagues,
In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through during the entire 20th century.
After the revolution, the Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons – may God judge them – added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population, and today these areas form the southeast of Ukraine. Then, in 1954, a decision was made to transfer Crimean Region to Ukraine, along with Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a city of union subordination. This was the personal initiative of the Communist Party head Nikita Khrushchev. What stood behind this decision of his – a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass repressions of the 1930’s in Ukraine – is for historians to figure out.
What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then. The decision was made behind the scenes. Naturally, in a totalitarian state nobody bothered to ask the citizens of Crimea and Sevastopol. They were faced with the fact. People, of course, wondered why all of a sudden Crimea became part of Ukraine. But on the whole – and we must state this clearly, we all know it – this decision was treated as a formality of sorts because the territory was transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened.
Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart. Things developed so swiftly that few people realised how truly dramatic those events and their consequences would be. Many people both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that the Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained empty promises, while the big country was gone. It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realised that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered.
At the same time, we have to admit that by launching the sovereignty parade Russia itself aided in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And as this collapse was legalised, everyone forgot about Crimea and Sevastopol ­– the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.
Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going through such hard times then that realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice. All these years, citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city. Yes, we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the existing reality and build our good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Meanwhile, our relations with Ukraine, with the fraternal Ukrainian people have always been and will remain of foremost importance for us.

Dashed hopes of friendship with a separated Ukraine and the dispair of its entire population

Today we can speak about it openly, and I would like to share with you some details of the negotiations that took place in the early 2000s. The then President of Ukraine Mr Kuchma asked me to expedite the process of delimiting the Russian-Ukrainian border. At that time, the process was practically at a standstill. Russia seemed to have recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations on delimiting the borders. Despite the complexity of the situation, I immediately issued instructions to Russian government agencies to speed up their work to document the borders, so that everyone had a clear understanding that by agreeing to delimit the border we admitted de facto and de jure that Crimea was Ukrainian territory, thereby closing the issue.
We accommodated Ukraine not only regarding Crimea, but also on such a complicated matter as the maritime boundary in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. What we proceeded from back then was that good relations with Ukraine matter most for us and they should not fall hostage to deadlock territorial disputes. However, we expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour, we hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilised state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law.
However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation. Moreover, Russians, just as other citizens of Ukraine are suffering from the constant political and state crisis that has been rocking the country for over 20 years.
I understand why Ukrainian people wanted change. They have had enough of the authorities in power during the years of Ukraine’s independence. Presidents, prime ministers and parliamentarians changed, but their attitude to the country and its people remained the same. They milked the country, fought among themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did not care much about the ordinary people. They did not wonder why it was that millions of Ukrainian citizens saw no prospects at home and went to other countries to work as day labourers. I would like to stress this: it was not some Silicon Valley they fled to, but to become day labourers. Last year alone almost 3 million people found such jobs in Russia. According to some sources, in 2013 their earnings in Russia totalled over $20 billion, which is about 12% of Ukraine’s GDP.

The hijacking of discontent in Maidan and Crimea's appeal to Russia

I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.
The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately ‘disciplined’ by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II.
It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.
Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.
Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.

The Kosovo precedent

First, we had to help create conditions so that the residents of Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future. However, what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law – better late than never.
Secondly, and most importantly – what exactly are we violating? True, the President of the Russian Federation received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet. Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement. True, we did enhance our forces there; however – this is something I would like everyone to hear and know – we did not exceed the personnel limit of our Armed Forces in Crimea, which is set at 25,000, because there was no need to do so.
Next. As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word. Ukraine used this right, yet the residents of Crimea are denied it. Why is that?
Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and “General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” Crystal clear, as they say.
I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is a quote from another official document: the Written Statement of the United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of international law.” End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.
We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human losses.
I will state clearly - if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation under control, there could have been casualties as well. Fortunately this did not happen. There was not a single armed confrontation in Crimea and no casualties. Why do you think this was so? The answer is simple: because it is very difficult, practically impossible to fight against the will of the people. Here I would like to thank the Ukrainian military – and this is 22,000 fully armed servicemen. I would like to thank those Ukrainian service members who refrained from bloodshed and did not smear their uniforms in blood.
Other thoughts come to mind in this connection. They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.

Yugoslavia, colour revolutions and US-NATO unilateral 'rule of the gun'

Colleagues,
Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. Key international institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall.
This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe, even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the 20th century, one of Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter, allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.
There was a whole series of controlled “colour” revolutions. Clearly, the people in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals. The Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter.
A similar situation unfolded in Ukraine. In 2004, to push the necessary candidate through at the presidential elections, they thought up some sort of third round that was not stipulated by the law. It was absurd and a mockery of the constitution. And now, they have thrown in an organised and well-equipped army of militants.

Russia offers of cooperation constantly rebuffed

We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps.
On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.
It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward. It happened with the endless foot-dragging in the talks on visa issues, promises of fair competition and free access to global markets.
Today, we are being threatened with sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite significant for us, our economy and our nation. For example, even during the times of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list. Today, they have formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are still in effect.
In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today. They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.
After all, they were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political instinct and common sense not to foresee all the consequences of their actions. Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard. You must always remember this.
Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the cold war and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

Thanks to China and India

At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate India’s reserve and objectivity.

To the people of the United States

Today, I would like to address the people of the United States of America, the people who, since the foundation of their nation and adoption of the Declaration of Independence, have been proud to hold freedom above all else. Isn’t the desire of Crimea’s residents to freely choose their fate such a value? Please understand us.

To the people of Europe - especially Germany

I believe that the Europeans, first and foremost, the Germans, will also understand me. Let me remind you that in the course of political consultations on the unification of East and West Germany, at the expert, though very high level, some nations that were then and are now Germany’s allies did not support the idea of unification. Our nation, however, unequivocally supported the sincere, unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity. I am confident that you have not forgotten this, and I expect that the citizens of Germany will also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity.

To the people of Ukraine

I also want to address the people of Ukraine. I sincerely want you to understand us: we do not want to harm you in any way, or to hurt your national feelings. We have always respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, incidentally, unlike those who sacrificed Ukraine’s unity for their political ambitions. They flaunt slogans about Ukraine’s greatness, but they are the ones who did everything to divide the nation. Today’s civil standoff is entirely on their conscience. I want you to hear me, my dear friends. Do not believe those who want you to fear Russia, shouting that other regions will follow Crimea. We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that. As for Crimea, it was and remains a Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean-Tatar land.
I repeat, just as it has been for centuries, it will be a home to all the peoples living there. It will never follow in Bandera’s footsteps!
Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian. Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians and the Ukrainians – could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective. Please think about it.

On the prospect of Ukraine as a NATO member

Let me note too that we have already heard declarations from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia. These are things that could have become reality were it not for the choice the Crimean people made, and I want to say thank you to them for this.
But let me say too that we are not opposed to cooperation with NATO, for this is certainly not the case. For all the internal processes within the organisation, NATO remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit NATO sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round.
Let me say quite frankly that it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see the people’s suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.
Let me say one other thing too. Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests and fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity.
We want to be friends with Ukraine and we want Ukraine to be a strong, sovereign and self-sufficient country. Ukraine is one of our biggest partners after all. We have many joint projects and I believe in their success no matter what the current difficulties. Most importantly, we want peace and harmony to reign in Ukraine, and we are ready to work together with other countries to do everything possible to facilitate and support this. But as I said, only Ukraine’s own people can put their own house in order.
Residents of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the whole of Russia admired your courage, dignity and bravery. It was you who decided Crimea’s future. We were closer than ever over these days, supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots.
Russia’s foreign policy position on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces. I want to thank everyone for this patriotic spirit, everyone without exception. Now, we need to continue and maintain this kind of consolidation so as to resolve the tasks our country faces on its road ahead.
Obviously, we will encounter external opposition, but this is a decision that we need to make for ourselves. Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where? Some Western politicians are already threatening us with not just sanctions but also the prospect of increasingly serious problems on the domestic front. I would like to know what it is they have in mind exactly: action by a fifth column, this disparate bunch of ‘national traitors’, or are they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation so as to provoke public discontent? We consider such statements irresponsible and clearly aggressive in tone, and we will respond to them accordingly. At the same time, we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good-neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world.

The Crimea referendum and future with Russia

Colleagues,
I understand the people of Crimea, who put the question in the clearest possible terms in the referendum: should Crimea be with Ukraine or with Russia? We can be sure in saying that the authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol, the legislative authorities, when they formulated the question, set aside group and political interests and made the people’s fundamental interests alone the cornerstone of their work. The particular historic, population, political and economic circumstances of Crimea would have made any other proposed option only temporary and fragile and would have inevitably led to further worsening of the situation there, which would have had disastrous effects on people’s lives. The people of Crimea thus decided to put the question in firm and uncompromising form, with no grey areas. The referendum was fair and transparent, and the people of Crimea clearly and convincingly expressed their will and stated that they want to be with Russia.
Russia will also have to make a difficult decision now, taking into account the various domestic and external considerations. What do people here in Russia think? Here, like in any democratic country, people have different points of view, but I want to make the point that the absolute majority of our people clearly do support what is happening.
The most recent public opinion surveys conducted here in Russia show that 95 percent of people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of other ethnic groups living in Crimea – 95 percent of our citizens. More than 83 percent think that Russia should do this even if it will complicate our relations with some other countries. A total of 86 percent of our people see Crimea as still being Russian territory and part of our country’s lands. And one particularly important figure, which corresponds exactly with the result in Crimea’s referendum: almost 92 percent of our people support Crimea’s reunification with Russia.
Thus we see that the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the absolute majority of the Russian Federation’s people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with Russia.
Now this is a matter for Russia’s own political decision, and any decision here can be based only on the people’s will, because the people is the ultimate source of all authority.
Members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol, today, in accordance with the people’s will, I submit to the Federal Assembly a request to consider a Constitutional Law on the creation of two new constituent entities within the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and to ratify the treaty on admitting to the Russian Federation Crimea and Sevastopol, which is already ready for signing. I stand assured of your support.

Source: http://rt.com/politics/official-word/vladimir-putin-crimea-address-658/